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No. 20151019-CA
INTHEUTAHCOURTOFAPPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.
ERNESTO NAVARRO,
Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

INTRODUCTION
As required by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(c), this reply brief is

"limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief." The brief
does not restate arguments from the opening brief or address matters that do not
merit reply.
ARGUMENT

I.

The prior consistent statements at issue were inadmissible
hearsay.
The prior consistent statements in this case were inadmissible hearsay

under Utah Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B). The State paints with a broad brush
the holding in several extra-jurisdictional cases to advocate for an expansion of
the controlling interpretation of Utah Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) in State v.

Bujan, 2008 UT 47, 190 P.3d 1255. The State cites United States v. Ellis, to argue
that Bujan held that "[d]espite rule 801(d)(1)(B) ... the law remains that
'postmotive statements can be admitted' for nonsubstantive, rehabilitative
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purposes." SB 24 (citing Bujan, 2008 UT 47, ,r 12; Ellis, 121 F.3d 908, 919 (4th
Cir. 1997)). In context, the quotation from Bujan is as follows: "Rule
801(d)(1)(B) does not bar admission of all postmotive statements seeking to be
admitted for rehabilitative purposes. As discussed above, there are other rules
available, if the proper conditions are met, under which postmotive statements
can be admitted." Bujan, 2008 UT 47, ,r 12.
The rule discussed in Bujan was the rule of completeness: "Even if the
testimony had been offered for rehabilitative purposes, it was still inappropriate
to admit the entirety of the testimony. Only testimony that directly rebuts
charges of recent fabrication is appropriate. Pursuant to the rule of completeness,
we have held that the standard for admitting oral statements is only admission of
those things that are relevant and necessary to qualify, explain, or place into
context the portion of testimony already introduced." Id.

~

10 (citations omitted)

(alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v.

Johnson, 2016 UT App 223, ~ 59 ("regardless of whether the witness statement
properly fell within the ambit of rule 801(d)(1)(B), the question before us is
whether the district court abused its discretion in determining that rule 106
[which provides that if a party introduces part of a writing, the adverse party may
require introduction of any other part that in fairness out to be considered at the
same time] required the admission of the remainder of the witness statement").
This limited exception for context prevents "abuses - a witness could bolster his
or her testimony by repeating the same version of facts to any number of persons
2
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who could then testify to those out-of-court statements." State v. Bujan, 2006
UT App 322, ,r 28, 142 P.3d 581 (citing Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 15758 (1995)).
The witnesses' inconsistent statements were not misleadingly taken out of
context in Navarro's case and the State has not argued otherwise. Suarez initially
claimed his party was dropping people off. R:1164. At trial, he admitted that his
party had just picked up gang members with the intention of starting a fight.
R:1164; 794. He lied when he told the police that unrelated parties were the
shooters. R:1164-65. He admitted at trial that he lied to the police, feeding them
"false information about three suspects that were totally innocent." R:811. There
was no clarifying context that would have mitigated these inconsistencies.
And the prior consistent statements the State subsequently introduced did
nothing to qualify, explain, or place into context the portion of the testimony
already introduced. "The purpose of rule 801(d)(1)(B) is ... not to bolster the
believability of a statement already uttered at trial." Bujan, 2008 UT 47, ,r 11
(internal quotation marks omitted). The prior consistent statements related to
who was driving, whether the other group threw gang signs, where the incident
occurred, who shot first, where Suarez was hit, and whether the officer believed
that these consistencies bolstered the witness's credibility. R:1166-68 ("Those
facts were everything related to the shooting.").
The State does not argue that the prior consistent statements had any
bearing on the specific inconsistent statements at issue - the State's only
3
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argument is that all the statements were "drawn from the very same investigative
reports from which the defendant drew the impeaching statements" and
therefore have "significant probative force bearing on credibility apart from mere
repetition." SB 25-26 (internal quotation marks omitted). But the source of the
consistent and inconsistent statements could only matter if the consistent
statements rebutted the defense's suggestion that there was any inconsistency in
the first place. Under the common law rule that consistent statements could be
introduced to rehabilitate a witness, usually "the other consistent statements
came from the same document or transcript and pertained to the same
supposedly inconsistent statement." United States v. Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19, 26
(1st Cir. 2001). This makes sense. A witness's statement should not be divorced
from the clarifying statements that surround it in the same document. But the
source of the prior consistent statements is irrelevant if it is not being used for
clarification. Where the defense introduced unambiguously inconsistent
statements, consistent statements from any source that do not "directly rebut[]"
the alleged inconsistencies or the suggestion of improper motive are no more
than repetition. See Bujan, 2008 UT 47, ,r,r 9-10.
The case law provides examples where prior inconsistent statements open
the door to prior consistent statements. In State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 390
(Utah 1957), the witness claimed at trial that robber's car was cream colored and
the defense introduced evidence that at the preliminary hearing "he had said the
robber's car was ... green." It was therefore appropriate to introduce evidence
4
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that the witness's first description of the robbery included a description of a
cream colored car. Id. at 390-92. "Insofar as [the officer's] testimony actually
supported the parts of [the witness's] testimony upon which impeachment was
attempted, that is, as to the color and model of the robber's car, his evidence was
properly admitted as rehabilitating testimony." Id. at 392. However, it was
"improperly admitted" "hearsay" for the officer to "go beyond the character of
f.i))

evidence just discussed and give the other details of [the witness's] story of the
crime." Id. In Navarro's case, the prior consistent statements related to "other
details" of the witness's story, not the specific statements denying his group's
decision to pick up gang members for the fight and his implication of innocent
parties, the statements "upon which impeachment was attempted." Id.
In State v. Mares, 192 P.2d 861,867 (Utah 1948), the defense suggested
that a doctor "had changed his theory on the course of the bullet since the time of
his previous statement." The prosecution wished to admit the complete autopsy
report in response, but the court admitted only "one part of the report" which
showed "the doctor's original findings on the course of the bullet which was
consistent with the evidence given by the doctor at the trial." Id. Again, the prior
consistent statements had direct bearing on the specific inconsistent statements
at issue.

It is unnecessary to look to other jurisdictions where controlling Utah
precedent has already decided the issue. See Bujan, 2008 UT 4 7; accord Sibert,
~

310 P.2d 388; Mares, 192 P.2d 861. The federal rule does not have the same
5
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legislative history, it does not have the same controlling case law, and it no longer
has the same language as the Utah rule. Under the federal rule, a declarantwitness's prior statement is admissible if it "is consistent with the declarant's
testimony and is offered: to rehabilitate the declarant's credibility as a witness
when attacked on another ground." Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B)(ii). 1 There is no
equivalent Utah amendment. But ultimately the evidence in this case would be
inadmissible even under the holdings of United States v. Ellis 121 F.3d 908 (4th
Cir. 1997), or United States v. Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19, 26 (1st Cir. 2001), the cases
the State relies on most heavily.
First, jurisdictions interpreting the rule have not done so with uniform
analysis. The Ninth Circuit "fail[ed] to see how a statement that has no probative
value in rebutting a charge of 'recent fabrication or improper influence or

WY

motive,' see Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B), could possibly have probative value for
the assertedly more 'limited' purpose of rehabilitating a witness. If 'repetition
does not imply veracity,' see State v. Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 1985),
then proof of repetition cannot rehabilitate." United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d
1255, 1272 (9th Cir. 1989). "In short, a prior consistent statement offered for

The amendment is geared towards "consistent statements that are probative to
explain what otherwise appears to be an inconsistency in the witness's
testimony," for example, to rebut a suggestion of faulty memory. Fed. R. Evid
801, Advisory Committee Notes to 2014 Amendments (emphasis added).
Therefore, under the amended federal rule, the inconsistent statements in
Navarro's case would not have opened the door to the prior consistent statements
at issue.
1
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rehabilitation is either admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) or it is not admissible
at all." Id. at 1273; see also State v. Nichols, 619 N.E.2d Bo, 84 & n.5 (Ohio
1993); State v. Fulton, 509 S.E.2d 819, 826-27 (S.C. 1998); Campbell v. State, 718
S.W.2d 712, 715-17 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1986). "[I]t has been only those
particular categories of prior consistent statements which have been able to
withstand the objection that the prior consistent statement is irrelevant to the
issue of the witness's credibility." United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 233 (2d
Cir. 1978).
Ultimately, however, jurisdictions agree that cross-examination on specific
inconsistencies does not open the door to general repetition of consistencies. As
the State "grant[s]," "the statement must have some rebutting force beyond the
mere fact that the witness has repeated on a prior occasion a statement consistent
with his trial testimony." SB 24-25. In United States v. Simonelli, a case the
State relies on, SB 24, 25, 26, 31, the First Circuit explained: "That Rule 801 does
not preclude admissibility does not establish that there is a basis for
admissibility." 237 F.3d at 27; see also Ellis, 121 F.3d at 920 (the Fourth Circuit
held that admitting prior consistent statements for rehabilitation "is in accord
with the 'Doctrine of Completeness"'); People v. Eppens, 979 P.2d 14, 20 (Colo.
1999) (explaining that, in addition to refuting motive, prior consistent statements
can be used for context, to deny there is any inconsistency, or to refute a
suggestion of flawed memory). "Whether there is a basis for admissibility is
determined by the interplay between the rule of completeness and the common
7
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law doctrine about prior consistent statements. Both evidentiary doctrines serve
a common interest: prior statements are admissible which tend to show the
statement is not really inconsistent when it is understood in its proper context."

Simonelli, 237 F.3d at 27. This was also the point the Utah Supreme Court
emphasized Bujan: "there are other rules available, if the proper conditions are
met, under which postmotive statements can be admitted." Bujan, 2008 UT 47, ,r
12.

The First Circuit held that the doctrine of completeness "does not permit
the admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence simply because ... a few
inconsistencies between out-of-court and in-court statements are revealed
through cross-examination; rather, it operates to ensure fairness where a
misunderstanding or distortion created by the other party can only be averted by
the introduction of the full text of the out-of-court statement." United States v.

Awon, 135 F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir. 1998). Therefore, in Simonelli, the court could
"see little basis for admissibility of the questioning about [the witness's] grand
jury testimony that went beyond the setting of context, explanation, and
completeness for the answers he gave on cross about his inconsistent answers to
the grand jury. There is no rule admitting all prior consistent statements simply
to bolster the credibility of a witness who has been impeached by particulars."

Simonelli, 237 F.3d at 28. The government could not "just present[] again the
testimony it presented on direct, this time through the testimony about
statements to the grand jury." Id.
8
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The same is true in Navarro's case - that the witness was not inconsistent
across the board did not help to explain or contextualize the patent
inconsistencies cross-examination revealed. The inconsistencies were not so
nuanced that, in proper context, the State could argue they were not
inconsistencies at all. See id. at 27. Furthermore, the prior consistent statements
did not rebut the specifics of defense counsel's impeachment. And the State does
not now cite the rule of completeness as a basis for the introduction of the prior
consistent statements at issue. SB 25-26. Rather, the prior consistent statements
generally "bolster[ed] the credibility of a witness who [had] been impeached by
particulars," id., and allowed the detective to vouch for the State's witness,
agreeing with the prosecutor that the witness's consistencies were "the type of
facts that were most related to [the] investigation." R:1168.
Finally, the State concedes that the evidence was inadmissible
substantively. The State claims that Navarro "must do more than show that the
challenged statements were inadmissible as substantive evidence under rule
801(d)(1)(B). He must show that they were also inadmissible as nonsubstantive
evidence to rehabilitate the witnesses Defendant had just impeached." SB 26.
But the prior consistent statements were never limited to their nonsubstantive
rehabilitative purposes. Defense counsel raised no objection and no limiting
instruction guided the jury's consideration. Without an objection or a limiting
instruction, it is all but impossible that the jury would have applied the
"nonsubstantive" distinction on which the State relies. This Court should not
9
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hold that "any objection to the evidence under that rule [801(d)(1)(B)] would
have been futile," where the objection would have limited the evidence. SB 18.
The cases the State cites relied on limiting instructions. In Ellis, 121 F.3d at
920-21, "the district court properly told the jury to use the prior consistent
statements only to assist in determining the credibility of the witness," defense
counsel did not object to the limitation, and "a jury" is presumed "to have
followed the court's instructions." In Simonelli, 237 F.3d at 26, the court
"instructed the jury that it could consider the inconsistencies only as they related
to the topic of whether a witness was to be believed." In United States v. Payne,
944 F.2d 1458, 1470 (9th Cir. 1991), the court "gave a limiting instruction to the
jury that the prior consistent statements were to be considered only on the issue
of credibility and not for the truth of the matter asserted." But in Navarro's case,

Ciiil

as in Bujan, "[n]o limiting instruction was provided to the jury that the testimony
was only admitted for rehabilitative purposes. As such, the testimony was
inappropriate hearsay and its admission improper." Bujan, 2008 UT 47, ,i 9.
Similarly, in Tome, the prior consistent statements were introduced "for
substantive purposes," requiring reversal. Tome, 513 U.S. at 164.
In sum, counsel's failure to object was deficient performance. The
objection would not have been futile. The State apparently concedes that it would
have at least limited the evidence to its "nonsubstantive purposes." SB 23-24.
Under Bujan, an objection would have excluded the evidence entirely. 2008 UT
47, ,r 9. And even under more permissive extra-jurisdictional standards, the
10
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evidence would not be admissible because it repeated unrelated consistencies
without clarifying the exposed inconsistencies. See Simonelli, 237 F.3d at 27.
II.

The State does not contest deficient performance related to the
imperfect self-defense instruction.
The State does not contest that the self-defense instruction was incorrect

and should have drawn an objection. R:31; 33 (assuming deficient performance
on this issue). Thus, this Court should hold that counsel's performance was
deficient. See Broderick v. Apartment Mgmt. Consultants, L.L.C., 2012 UT 17, ,r
19, 279 P.3d 391 (reversing where appellee left appellant's claim unrebutted).
III.

~

The two errors in this case, individually or cumulatively,
prejudiced Navarro.
The two errors in this case individually and cumulatively "undermine

confidence in the verdict" and create a "reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
~

different." State v. King, 2010 UT App 396, ,r,r 23, 30, 248 P.3d 984 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The standard is "substantially short of the 'more
probable than not' portion of the spectrum." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920
(Utah 1987). This is because, as the United States Supreme Court explained
when it first articulated the standard, "[a]n ineffective assistance claim asserts
the absence of one of the crucial assurances that the result of the proceeding is
reliable, so finality concerns are somewhat weaker [than in cases of newly

11
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discovered evidence] and the appropriate standard of prejudice should be
~

somewhat lower." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
The admission of the prior consistent statements improperly bolstered the
witness's story. OB 12. When an officer repeats prior statements from a witness,
"[t]he jury may well have regarded the officer's evidence as more persuasive than
that of [the witness]. From the record it appears that [the officer] was more
confident and self-assured, and was able to be more definite as to the detail of the
crime than the complaining witness himself." State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388,392
(Utah 1957). Similarly, the officer in Navarro's case had apparent credibility as a
third party who did not participate in the shooting and he was able to testify that
the witness's account was "everything related to the shooting." R:1167. The
improperly admitted hearsay provided important "corroboration" and was not
harmless error. See State v. Bujan, 2006 UT App 322, 'if 32, 142 P.3d 581; Sibert,
310 P.2d at 392.
The imperfect self-defense instruction was also prejudicial. This Court
reversed because of an erroneous imperfect self-defense instruction in State v.

Garcia, 2016 UT App 59, 'if'if 11-26, 370 P.3d 970. In that case, one instruction
"incorrectly stated that in order to convict [the defendant] of attempted
manslaughter, the jury had to find that the State had disproved the affirmative
defense of imperfect self-defense." Id. 'if 14. The instruction "misstated the law
regarding the application of a defense about which the State had conceded [the
defendant] was entitled to have the jury instructed." Id. 'if 16. This Court wrote
12
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that "'an accurate instruction upon the basic elements of an offense is essential.
Failure to so instruct constitutes reversible error. Thus, the failure to give this
accurate instruction can never be harmless error."' Id. 'if 23 (alterations omitted)
(quoting State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, 'if 26, 52 P.3d 1210). The Court reversed in

Garcia because there was a "reasonable basis for the jury to conclude" that the
defense applied, the standard for providing the instruction, and therefore
"necessarily a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, the result
would have been different," the standard for reversal. Id. 'if 25 (alterations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Similarly, in this case, the court instructed the jury on imperfect selfdefense without objection from the prosecution because there was a reasonable
basis for it in the evidence. R:1153-55. Furthermore, unlike Garcia, where the
Court called the defense "odd" in the context of the record, there was a strong
09

case for imperfect self-defense on the record in Navarro's case. See Garcia, 2016
UT App 59, 'if 25. Navarro testified that the people in the Avalanche were the
aggressors. R:1177. He testified that he got his gun because he was scared but
that he never told his companions that he intended to do anything to the other
group. R:1179-80. And he testified bullets came from the Avalanche first.
R: 1184; 1171. Navarro's return of fire was not force used in the commission of a

felony or combat by agreement, as the State suggests. SB 28. But there was also
evidence that, although it was reasonable for Navarro to believe he was acting in
complete self-defense, he was not justified in firing his weapon. R:980 (member
13
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of Navarro's party testifying he believed he was defending himself "but seeing,
seeing the evidence and the police reports, I guess it was insufficient selfdefense.").
The State argues that Navarro "completely ignore[d] evidence - much of it
from his own co-horts." SB 28. Navarro did not ignore this evidence, he
contested it. OB 5-6; 20-22. And this is not a question of sufficiency of the
evidence, where the standard of review is "highly deferential" and the "evidence is
to be viewed in the light most favorable to the State." Compare State v. Mccallie,
2016 UT App 4, ,I 39, 369 P.3d 103 (alterations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted), with Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (finality concerns are weaker in
the "absence of one of the crucial assurances that the result of the proceeding is
reliable"). The question is whether, absent the evidentiary errors, there is a
reasonable likelihood that the jury would have believed Navarro's testimony or at
least found a reasonable doubt in the State's case.
True, Navarro's two companions testified that he left the apartment with
the intention of fighting the Avalanche occupants. SB 28-29. But Navarro
testified under oath that he did not intend to start the fight or to engage in
combat by agreement. R:1179-80. And the jury had cause to question his
companions' credibility. One companion, Irvin Munoz, was on probation for a
felony weapon charge. R:903. He was scared of going to jail. R:913-14. And
although he initially "didn't remember" telling the police "what if I told you
Ernesto was the shooter" when "discussing plea deals," R:914, the transcript
14
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refreshed his recollection that he was "trying to negotiate with them" with the
"main concern" of "making sure [he] wasn't incarcerated so [he] could take care
of [his] mother." R:913-15. He was not charged in connection with the incident.
R:915. The other cohort, Irving Nunez, also fired shots. R:952. But by the time

of trial he had already negotiated a plea deal with the State. R:959. These men
may have been Navarro's cohorts, but they were the State's witnesses.
Each of Navarro's associates had a motive to pin the blame on Navarro.
R:915; 959. And even so, their testimony supported Navarro in several important

respects. Irving Nunez testified that the Avalanche was following them as they
tried to lose it during the initial encounter and that he feared the occupants of the
Avalanche were armed. R:971. He testified that he heard and felt a bullet whiz by
his head before his party fired any shots, that he feared for his life, and that he
believed he was defending himself "but seeing, seeing the evidence and the police
reports, I guess it was insufficient self-defense." R:980. And Irvin Munoz
"thought" but did not know whether there were shots fired from the Avalanche at
trial, but had previously told the detective that he thought a shot was fired from
the Avalanche. R:901-02. In fact, he initially told the detectives, "I swear to god I
saw, I heard gunshots before Ernesto put his hand up to start shooting." R:919.
He also testified that another man in their party saw the Avalanche coming first,
"yelled out that there was a lot more people in the Avalanche," and sounded
scared. R:918. At that point, Navarro's group tried to get away. R:918.
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Navarro testified that he did not provoke the use of force, did not intend to
commit a felony, was not engaged in combat by agreement, and was not the
aggressor. R:1179. As in State v. Campos, another case where an improper
instruction on imperfect self-defense following a confrontation between two

~

armed parties merited reversal, "the conclusion of the jurors [was] based on their
weighing conflicting evidence or evidence susceptible of differing
~

interpretations," and therefore likely influenced by "the erroneous statement of
the burden of proof." 2013 UT App 213, 'if 71, 309 P.3d 1160 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Counsel's failure to object and request an accurate imperfect
self-defense manslaughter instruction was prejudicial.
Finally, the two errors worked together - both the inadmissible hearsay
and the faulty instruction prevented the jury from considering imperfect selfdefense. The State points to inconsistencies and minimizing in Navarro's initial
statements to police. SB 29. But this is why it was important for the jury to
understand that members of the other party displayed the same behavior. Both
parties displayed what the State believes evidences "consciousness of guilt." SB
35. However, Navarro had reason to fear that the situation looked incriminating
- either because he acted in self-defense but the other party was injured or
because he acted in imperfect self-defense, which is still a serious felony. Suarez,
on the other hand, had no reason to mislead the police if his party was both
injured and innocent. But instead, the State was allowed to introduce prior
consistent statements and argument to suggest that the police had full confidence
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in Suarez and his party. R:1166-68. And the jury was instructed that Navarro
had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted in imperfect
self-defense. R:452. Absent these errors, there was a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable outcome.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above and in the opening brief, Navarro respectfully
requests that this Court reverse.
SUBMITTED this ~day of December, 2016.
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